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Abstract
Deep learning algorithms and networks are vul-
nerable to perturbed inputs which is known as
adversarial attack. Many defense methodologies
have been investigated to defend against such ad-
versarial attack. In this work, we propose a novel
methodology to defend the existing powerful at-
tack model. We for the first time introduce a new
attacking scheme for the attacker and set a prac-
tical constraint for white box attack. Under this
proposed attacking scheme we present the best
defense ever reported against some of the recent
strong attacks. It consists of a set of non linear
function to process the input data which will make
it more robust over adversarial attack. However,
we make this processing layer completely hidden
from the attacker. Blind pre-processing improves
the white box attack accuracy of MNIST from
94.3% to 98.7%. Even with increasing defense
when others defenses completely fails, blind pre-
processing remains one of the strongest ever re-
ported. Another strength of our defense is that,
it eliminates the need for adversarial training as
it can significantly increase the MNIST accuracy
without adversarial training as well. Additionally,
blind pre-processing can also increase the infer-
ence accuracy in the face of powerful attack on
Cifar-10 and SVHN data set as well without much
sacrificing clean data accuracy.
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Network (DNN) has achieved great success
in performing classification (Andor et al., 2016), image
detection (He et al., 2015) and speech recognition (Xiong
et al., 2016). All these successes lead to another interest-
ing topic about how well DNN will perform practically
depends heavily on how well we address the issues concern-
ing the security of these complex models. It was observed
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by Szegedy et al. (2014) for computer vision (Goodfellow
et al., 2014) and Biggio et al. (2013) for malware detection
(Biggio et al., 2013) that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial
examples which can be generated just by slightly changing
inputs or by introducing random noise to the inputs. Not
only image classification but also other popular fields of
DNN are facing vulnerability to adversarial examples (Kos
et al., 2017; Kos & Song, 2017). Similarly, The behaviour of
popular Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) models is no
exception as it shows no resistance to adversarial examples.
Figure 1. Adversarial attack causing miss classification in MNIST
data set
There are now various works on generating adversarial at-
tacks and developing corresponding defense methods. At-
tacking CNN can be classified into two major categories. In
one case the attacker has full access to the network model
and parameter which is known as white box attack. On
the other hand, for black box attack the attacker sees the
model as a black box and can only play with the data. Fast
Gradient sign method is one of the popular white box attack
method which uses the sign of the gradient of loss function
(Goodfellow et al., 2014). Different authors have proposed
different attack models to adapt the attacking techniques
beating the improving defenses (Szegedy et al., 2013; Ku-
rakin et al., 2016; Kos & Song, 2017; Papernot et al., 2016a;
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016). Some of the recent attack
methods achieved even better success causing CNN to clas-
sify whole MNIST data set to wrong classes. For example,
projected gradient descent is one of the most powerful white
box attack till date (Ma˛dry et al., 2017).
Many defense method have been proposed to beat adver-
sarial attacks. Some of them achieved good successes
mainly against weak attacks, such a Fast Gradient Sign
Method(FGSM) and Jacobian Slaiency Map attack (JSMA)
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(Gu & Rigazio, 2014; Papernot et al., 2016c;b; Xu et al.,
2017). However, None of them could recover current state
of the art accuracy against powerful attacks. One major
improvement to the those defenses came when defending
model started using adversarial examples while training
(Tramèr et al., 2017; Ma˛dry et al., 2017). But this defense
has to two major drawbacks. First, as a defender we do not
know the attack model. So it is difficult to choose which
adversarial attack method should be used to generate ad-
versary for training. Second, it would double training cost.
Still most recent defenses use this technique to strengthen
their defense. In this work we look to eliminate the need for
using adversarial training by processing the input with the
objective to make the neural network more robust. More-
over, we observed all these defenses mentioned here loses
its strength when the attack strength is increased. So by
implementing this proposed defense we look to make the
defense more robust against a wide variety of attacks.
Inspired by recent One hot coding and thermometer en-
coding of input data (Jacob Buckman, 2018), in this work,
we propose blind pre-processing (BP) of input data. We
process the input data using Tanh function, batch normaliza-
tion, thermometer encoding and one hot encoding. These
techniques work in combination with discrete data to de-
fend CNN against adversarial attacks. However, we change
the attack set up by introducing an engineering solution
to the gradient problem suggested by recent Obfuscated
Gradients paper (Athalye et al., 2018). From the work of
obfuscating gradient it is obvious that no white box defense
model would work in the presence of powerful attack model.
Specifically, none of them would work if it has gradient
shattering, stochastic gradient and vanishing gradient as
their defense weapon. They also suggested thermometer
encoding is using stochastic gradient and they could fool
this defense by their proposed attacking model. However,
we introduce a more practical white box attack where the
attacker will have access to the model, weights, input, gra-
dient and training algorithm but not to the pre-processing
layer. we will use obfuscated logic design by proposing a
hardware assisted pre-processing layer to counter the ob-
fuscated gradient’s false sense of security (Athalye et al.,
2018). We strongly believe their attack model has too many
freedom and restricting the defense with a lot of constraints.
As a result, we believe future attack model should evaluate
their models strength by considering this blind processing
layer in front of the model. This defense is more realistic
for practical application such as autonomous vehicles.
Our proposed defense method makes the CNN more ro-
bust to defend the strongest attack, Logit Space Gradient
Ascent(LS-PGA) attack and also the general strong attack
suggested by Anish et. al (Athalye et al., 2018). It is a
modified version of PGD attack on discrete data. The main
contribution of this work is that we could achieve very high
accuracy on MNIST without adversary training for the first
time. If we include adversary training, our defense method-
ology provides the best accuracy against MNIST, Cifar 10
and SVHN till date. Not only that with increasing attack
strength when all the defenses completely fails, blind pre-
processing still defends the CNN causing minimal accuracy
loss. Contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• We derived from the previous analysis of adversarial
examples that introducing non linearity would increase
the defense to any adversarial attack. As a result, We
introduced a series of functions performing non linear
transformation of input data to build a robust defense.
• After making the model robust using pre-processing
we propose obfuscated logic based implementation of
the pre-processing layer so that this network do not fail
due to its obfuscated gradients. This modification will
also make all the defense that use obfuscated gradient
to succeed again.
• This proposed defense resulted in increasing the accu-
racy for MNIST data set from 94.02% to 98.66% with
adversarial training and from 0% to 98.29% without
adversarial training. This is the best so far achieved
on LS-PGA attack without adversarial examples. Even
with adversarial training, previous attempts could only
reach as far as 95%.
• We showed that with increasing attack strength our
defense remains one of the strongest. Our analysis
provides a more detailed understanding of why blind
pre-processing stands out in the advent of adversary
attack while others fail.
• Additionally by using Adversary training we could
achieve 95.06% accuracy on SVHN data set and
86.66% accuracy on Cifar 10 data set.
In the next two sections we summarize the attack model
and blind processing scheme to defend those attack models.
In section IV our proposed defense technique is described
and the following two sections represents the results and
analysis of the proposed BP method.
2. Attack Algorithm
In this work, we assume that the adversary has complete
access to the network which is popularly known as the white
box attack. It was observed from previous works that if a
defense model performs well for white box attack it should
naturally perform better against black box attack (Ma˛dry
et al., 2017). Since black box attack becomes really weak
due to the unavailability of network parameters. That is why
in general any defense that wants to prove its effectiveness
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Table 1. Classification of the strength of the attacks
Attack FGSM JSMA C & W PGD
List of
defense
it can
beat
x x
1.Distillation
2. Feature
Squeezing
1.Distillation
2. Feature
squeezing
3. PGD
training
4.Thermometer
(Without adv)
Strength Weak Weak Medium Strong
must perform well against white box attack. In order to for-
mulate the attack method for this work, we first investigate
some of the popular white box attack models:
Madry et al. introduced Projected gradient descent which
achieved 100% success in fooling CNN to miss classify
MNIST dataset (Ma˛dry et al., 2017). In their work they
show that PGD will generate universal adversary among the
first order approaches. They suggested that training network
with this kind of adversary would make the neural network
more robust. Taking their work forward this algorithm was
modified for discrete input (Jacob Buckman, 2018) known
as discrete gradient ascent and logit spcae projected gradient
ascent.
Algorithm 1 LS-PGA Attack
Input: Image(x),Label(l), attack steps(n), , δ,k(quantized
level),Loss function L(w,f(x),l)
mask = 0
low = max[0, x− ]
high = min[0, x+ ]
for i = 1 to k + 1 do
mask = mask + fsdi(α ∗ low + (1− α ∗ high)
end for
u0 Initialization using mask
T = 1
z0 = F (σ(u0/T ))
for j = 1 to n do
grad = ∇zj−1 .L(w, zj−1, y)
uj = uj−1 + .grad
zj = σ(zj−1/T )
T = T.δ
end for
output: z after n iteration
Since this method is more suitable for discrete inputs we
choose to evaluate our model against this attack. Addi-
tionally the success of this white box attack tempted us to
evaluate our defense model against it. Finally, based on
the success of these attacks against varying defenses we
summarize their strength in table 1.
The vast majority of machine learning problem is solved
with first order methods like gradient descent or other
closely modified versions. That is why those attacks that
rely on only first order information could be labeled as uni-
versal attack. Since LS-PGA/PGD attack model depends
only on the first order information, defending against LS-
PGA attack would certainly make the model robust against
a wide variety of attack models. This attack takes place by
placing each pixel in a random bucket within . At each step
of the attack it will look at that bucket to find values within
 of the true value and select value that will do the most
harm. The outcome of this attack will vary depending on the
initialization. So the attack needs to be run several times to
get the desired result. In case of Logit space projected gradi-
ent ascent first discrete encoding was relaxed to continuous
space to perform projected gradient ascent. By changing
the values of  and attack step we can certainly change the
strength of the attack. We report the performance of our
defense against varying attack strength in section VI.
Recent attack developed by (Athalye et al., 2018) is reported
to be the more generalized and powerful till now. They not
only fool the thermometer encoding but also all the recent
defenses. In the next section based on their analysis we
introduce the concept of blind processing and also present
why obfuscated gradient can actually work as a defense
under our defense model. Moreover, we present a attacking
scheme for future attacking models to test and evaluate their
attack models.
3. Concept of Blind Pre-Processing
Obfuscated gradient occur due to gradient shattering,
stochastic gradient and gradient vanishing (Athalye et al.,
2018). From the analysis presented by (Athalye et al., 2018),
it is evident any defense that uses one of these as their
weapon to defend the adversary that will eventually fail.
As reported this obfuscated gradient gives a false sense of
security. Their generalized attack have caused all of the
recent defense models to fail. Thermometer encoding is no
exception as it has both gradient shattering and stochastic
gradient issue. For our defense to work we need to make
this obfuscated gradient based defense to function properly
in the advent of powerful attack. So the final conclusion
is in a typical white box attack set up it is impossible to
defend white box adversarial attack. Even though (Ma˛dry
et al., 2017) defense works but the success is very small.
We conclude that the attacker has too many freedom and
defense is constrained by different optimization problems.
As a result, we propose a more practical way of dealing with
the problem on hand. We propose blind processing where
this processing layer is absolutely unknown to the attacker.
In this defense model, the attacker can not access the func-
tion of the pre-processing layer. We use obfuscated logic
to hide the design of our pre-processing layer. The attacker
can access the input and output of the process but can never
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predict the functionality of the model. Previous work have
been done in this field using hybrid polymorphic logic gate
to obscure the functionality of a logic gate. We propose
using such logic gate to pre-process the data in a practi-
cal application such as autonomous vehicle. In this way
the attacker can never replicate the module for two reason.
Firstly, the layout using polymorphic logic looks same for
all kinds of logic. In this way the hacker can never predict
the functionality by hacking the module and analyzing lay-
out. Secondly, the attacker can never guess the functionality
using the pattern of input and output of the pre-processing
layer because this logic is key assisted. In this way whoever
does not have the key can never access the pre-processing
module to generate input output data. The user have always
the power to use this particular key to train the model and
can switch off this particular functionality using another key.
Additionally, the user can also use different key for differ-
ent pre-processing functions. As a result it would become
impossible for the attacker to guess the functionality of the
defense model in the inference mode as well. In this way the
whole pre-processing layer becomes a blind pre-processing
layer for the attacker. Additionally, the key of this kind of
logic is also secured. If the pre-processing layer has an input
of M and logic gate of N then total number of key would
be 2M+3N . So for a typical MNIST classifier the input to
that function would be 256 and even if we assume the pre-
processing layer is a simple and operation it still would have
close to 9X1077 possible key combination. practically this
is impossible for the attacker to hack in a limited amount of
time. From this proposal we assure the security of the pre-
processing layer which we define as blind pre-processing.
As suggested by (Athalye et al., 2018) that a defence must
define the attackers accessibility to make the defenses more
practical. In our case, blind pre-processing keeps all the
other attribute of the white box attack in tact. The attacker
still has access to the following information:
1. Model architecture
2. weights and gradients
3. Training algorithm
4. Training data before and after pre-processing
However, we are denying two accessibility to the attacker.
Firstly, the attacker can not predict the pre-processing layer
nor access the layer for gradients. Secondly access query
is not allowed without the key in the pre-processing layer.
This two attributes constitute the blind pre-processing.
From the analysis of (Athalye et al., 2018) we concluded
that it is impossible for traditional defenses to defend under
the previous attacking scheme. As a consequence we intro-
duce the concept of blind pre-processing to encounter the
obfuscated gradient issue. As a result we set a new attacking
Figure 2. Attacker access zone under Blind Pre-Processing defense
scheme to evaluate their attack model against our defense
model. We strongly claim that with blind pre-processing
the generalized attack method suggested by (Athalye et al.,
2018) becomes a failure. We suggest future attack model
to generate adversary without back propagating through the
pre-processing layer or generate adversary just by using the
data after pre-processing layer. Since this new scheme for
white box attack is more practical and gives the attacker
some form of challenge. Thus any attack that want to suc-
ceed must prove its worth by beating these obfuscated gra-
dient based defenses without approximating their gradient.
Under this blind pre-processing defense model approximat-
ing the pre-processing function is close to impossible let
alone the gradient.
4. Proposed Defense Method
In the analysis of existence of adversary in deep neural net-
work, goodfellow et al. (Goodfellow et al., 2014) concluded
that deep neural networks exhibit vulnerability to adversar-
ial examples due to their extreme linearity. Linearity of
these models is the reason why they can not resist adversary.
For example MNIST data set has an input precision of 8
bit. As a result, a common notion would be why a network
would respond differently when the input is x+  instead
of x where  is really small. However, as practical exper-
iments show that they do behave differently to these two
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inputs. To understand this we have to look into the linearity
theory of deep models. Output of neural network y could
be represented as y= σ(WTX ′).
WTX ′ =WTX +WT  (1)
Even if  is really small, if a weight matrix has n dimension
and an average value of m, then this perturbation would
result in *m*n increase of activation. Thus with increased
dimension, this noise keeps increasing linearly. It suggests
that, with sufficient large input dimension, a network will al-
ways be vulnerable to adversary. It would then provide two
possible directions to solve this issue. One is to introduce
non-linearity to the network and the other is to eliminate
unnecessary information from input data. First one is a
bit tricky as introducing non-linearity inside the neural net-
work creates problem for calculating gradient. Previously,
Different non-linear activation functions were investigated
but none of them worked due to the difficulty of comput-
ing gradients and poor accuracy on real test data set. So
in this work, we choose the second direction by adding
a pre-processing layer in front of neural network model
which will not have any gradient issue. Additionally, blind
processing makes the obfuscated gradient issue suggested
by (Athalye et al., 2018) nullified. Moreover, adding pre-
processing layer in front of the CNN model does not hamper
the accuracy on clean data.
Our proposed blind pre-processing (BP) has tanh and Batch
Normalization (BN) to process the input data in an attempt
to make the CNN more robust. As shown in fig. 2 The input
data goes through a non linear transformation first which
is tanh function. A batch normalization layer is also added
which is similar to the BN layer in CNN but it does not
have any learnable parameters. After blind pre-processing
input data were quantized to 15 different levels. They were
presented in vectorized form of one hot coded value. Finally,
they were encoded using thermometer encoding which basi-
cally inverts all the digits after first one appears. We observe
that adding blind pre-processing before qunatization made
the defense model more robust. So during all our experi-
ment we quantize the input data after blind pre-processing.
In our experiment it was found that adversarial training was
no longer necessary for MNIST.
We also believe those function that uses local information
works well as pre-processing layer. Moreover, this pre-
processing can not sacrifice much accuracy on the clean data
at the same time. Previously, thermometer encoding and
quantization were suggested as some form of pre-processing.
Our proposed blind pre-processing layer consists of tanh
and batch normalization layer. But there could be other
possible function that can be used as a blind pre-processing
layer. The description of the functionality of those layers
are presented here:
1. Tanh and Sigmoid Function: The most popular activa-
tion functions are Sigmoid and Tanh functions. Both
functions are used in typical deep neural networks.
Mathematically they can be expressed as:
Ftanh(x) =
ex − e−x
ex + e−x
(2)
Fsigmoid(x) =
1
1 + e−x
(3)
Again during experiments it was observed that tanh
outperforms sigmoid function. So we choose tanh to
do the non linear transformation in the first layer.
2. Batch Normalization (BN) function: Our normaliza-
tion layer is similar to the batch normalization layer in
a typical Convolutional Neural Network. However, it
does not have any learnable parameters. Rather, this
is just a pre-processing layer in front of the original
neural network model.The function can be written as
this:
Y =
X − µ
σ
(4)
where Y and X denote the input and output tensor
respectively. σ, µ represents the standard deviation and
mean of the input data for that particular batch. This is
a linear layer which basically makes the mean of the
input data to be zero and standard deviation to one.
We used tanh in place of sigmoid in this work. As these
set of combinations were found to perform better than the
other. Each input image is passed through a tanh layer
which works as a filter. Followed by a 3 by 3 filter of
Maximum smoothing. Then the data goes through a Batch
Normalization layer followed by a 15 level quantization.
Finally encoded values were feed into the model for training.
5. Experimental Results
5.1. Performance in MNIST Data set
Our proposed defense method was first tested on a simple
LeNet architecture for MNIST data set.MNISt is a set of
hand written digit with 55000 training data and 10000 test-
ing data. We used LS-PGA attack model to evaluate our
model as described in section 2. In LS-PGA, we set  =0.3,
δ = 1.2, xi=1 and step-of-attack = 7 for the following exper-
iments. Here,  indicates how much the input pixels can be
changes and δ is the attack step as described in section II. In
the later section, we also varied such parameters to see the
effects on the performance of our proposed defense method.
Our defense model uses various processing layers to defend
against adversary. We here investigate the efficacy of indi-
vidual and combination of different pre-processing layers.
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Tanh function was chosen to be the first layer of blind pre-
processing. It was found that the performance is better if we
put tanh function before batch normalization layer.
Table 2. Result of Sigmoid and Tanh Functions
Function Clean training ADV training
Sigmoid 0 8
tanh 69.55 94.42
Table 2 indicates that the performance of tanh was far better
than sigmoid as a filtering function. As a result, for our
experiment we choose tanh instead of sigmoid. Meanwhile,
thermometer encoding fails completely when adversarial
training was removed. Whereas tanh function improved the
accuracy even without adversary training. After tanh, we
add a smoothing layer to investigate the effect of this layer.
Based on the experiment, we observe maximum smoothing
performs better than average smoothing.
Figure 3. Effect of changing the batch size both with and without
adversarial training
One of the key function here is the batch normalization layer.
As a result, the batch size becomes an important tuning pa-
rameter for this defense to optimize. We also investigated
the defense efficacy using varying batch size on blind pre-
processing. Increasing the batch size would increase the
accuracy of the overall data set. Because if the batch size
is one, batch normalization is the same as normalizing the
whole image. In experiments, we found that there is an opti-
mal batch size to achieve highest accuracy without adversary
training as shown in fig. 3. When adversarial training is
included, in general, the accuracy increases when increasing
batch size. For the case of no adversary training, we found
that an optimum batch size of 50, which leads to the best
accuracy. However, looking at the clean training we decided
to choose an optimum batch size of 100 for our experiments.
Because in figure 4 the red line goes up a little bit while blue
Table 3. Accuracy on MNIST dataset using different defense com-
bination
Train
Type
Work
Type Defense Clean Attack
Original CNN No defense 99.45 0
Without
Adv.
Training
Proposed
BP
BN 99.23 98.05
Tanh 99.56 69.55
Tanh & BN 99.2 98.3
Previous
Work
Thermometer
Encoding 99.2 0
Madry et. al
PGD Train 99.4 0
With
Adv.
Training
Proposed
BP
BN 99.4 98.64
Tanh 99.5 94.42
Tanh & BN 99.43 98.65
Previous
Work
Thermometer
Encoding 99.03 94.02
Madry et al.
PGD train 99.2 95.7
line goes down from 50 to 100 batch size. It means we could
optimize the accuracy between with adversary training and
without adversary training using a batch size of 100 in place
of 50.
Table 3 tabulates the accuracy in MNIST with different com-
bination of blind pre-processing layers as discussed above.It
gives more insight about their performance against the at-
tack model. The experiment were performed using two
different types of training. Clean training is performed on
original training data of MNIST. While adversarial training
includes adversarial examples inside the training data. Both
training result was evaluated using clean data and attack
data. Clean data test basically tells how well the network
performs the classification task when there is no attack. One
of the key point here is to find which combination works as
a better defense method, while causing clean data accuracy
to go down marginally. However, by including adversarial
training this loss of accuracy could be recovered. This is
quite obvious as adversarial training increases the overall
robustness of the network. Batch normalization turns out to
be the most powerful tool in this defense when we do not
include adversarial training. As a result tanh and smoothing
filter fails without the support of batch normalization. The
best result without adversary training could be obtained is
98.36 % which is one of the major contribution of this de-
fense. Previously, both thermometer encoding and Madry et
al. found that, under PGD/LS-PGA attack, CNN accuracy
drops to zero on MNIST data set without adverarial train-
ing.Moreover, the combinations that include BN & Tanh
and Smoothing & BN also performed really well to defend
against adversary without adversary training. Based on the
experimental results, it could be concluded that adverarial
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Table 4. Result in SVHN dataset
Train
Type
Work
Type Defense Clean Attack
Original CNN No defense 95.1 6.99
Without
Adv.
Training
Proposed
BP
BN 81.16 47.71
Tanh 96.56 49.39
Tanh & BN 84.19 47.86
Previous
Work
Thermometer
/ 96.96 48.02
With
Adv.
Training
Proposed
BP
BN 45.50 93.48
Tanh 96.11 95.06
Tanh & BN 59.84 94.55
Previous
Work
Thermometer
/ 97.18 95.02
training is not necessary using our proposed defense method
for MNIST dataset, which reduces training overhead and
keeps the accuracy on the clean data to 99.24 %.
Additionally if adversarial training is included in our pro-
posed method, the accuracy could further be improved. In
this case, the combination of tanh function and batch nor-
malization provides the best performance up to 98.65 %
result. Smoothing only helps to defend the attack when
adversary training is not included. Next, we will conduct
similar analysis in another two famous dataset, i.e. Cifar 10
and SVHN.
5.2. Performance in SVHN dataset
The Street View House Numbers (SVHN) Dataset is a real
world image for testing machine learning algorithms. For
SVHN data set, we used Resnet-18 architecture (He et al.,
2016) in experiment and achieved state-of-the-art accuracy.
Instead we only used tanh function for blind pre-processing
on SVHN dataset. For this data set we used  =0.047,
δ = 1.2 xi=1 and step of attack = 10 as the the attack model
parameter. We choose different attack model parameter for
different data sets as reported by thermometer encoding de-
fense. (Jacob Buckman, 2018) just to make the comparison
fair.
From table-4, we could easily observe the effect of this
defense changes for SVHN dataset. Firstly, batch normal-
ization still works as a strong defense but it causes the clean
data accuracy to go down a lot. Tanh and Smoothing per-
forms better than thermometer encoding without adversarial
training. Looking at the clean data accuracy we propose
to keep only the tanh function for defending against adver-
sary against SVHN dataset. Our proposed defense method
combined with adversarial training could achieve 95.06 %
accuracy. But adversarial training had to be used since we
removed BN for SVHN data to encounter for the loss of
accuracy on clean data. Batch normalization layer worked
Table 5. Result on CIFAR 10 dataset
Train
Type
Work
Type Defense Clean Attack
Original CNN No defense 93.72 4.10
Without
Adv.
Training
Proposed
BP
BN 79.27 10.69
Tanh 90.36 46.14
Tanh & BN 79.67 15.45
Previous
Work
Thermometer
Encoding 90.42 43.5
With
Adv.
Training
Proposed
BP
BN 53.61 75
Tanh 89.52 86.61
Tanh & BN 63.71 77.46
Previous
Work
Thermometer
Encoding 90.18 83.6
as the key component in the defense of MNIST without
adversary training. However, after including the adversary
training and blind pre-processing we could recover state of
the art accuracy on SVHN data set as well.
So here one of the key problem of using batch normalization
and smoohting is that they do sacrifice a lot of clean data ac-
curacy. After using BN and smoohting in the pre-processing
layer we see that clean data accuracy drops down to 45.50
% and 69.12 % respectively. As a result even though they
provide some form of non-linearity but fail as a defense.
Thus one of the key conclusion from this work is that if
we find more non-linear function that do not sacrifice clean
data accuracy then they might be a potential candidate as a
robust defense.
5.3. Performance in Cifar 10 dataset
For Cifar 10 data set, we used Resnet-50 architecture with
a little bit of modification on the attack strength. Even
though thermometer encoding reported that using wider
network helps in increasing the accuracy against adversarial
examples and wide resnet is found to perform really well in
defending adversary. However, in this paper we wanted to
show the performance of functional filter in improving the
accuracy from the previous defense model and we leave the
analysis on the choice of architecture for future investigation.
We choose the attack parameter for cifar 10 with  equal to
0.031 and number of step of attack equal to 7.
Similar to SVHN we found good result using tanh as a
pre-processing filter for cifar 10 data. Additionally, it is
observed that thermometer encoding produced a lower ac-
curacy even without adversarial training. We could improve
the accuracy without adversary training by 3% while main-
taining close to 90% accuracy on clean data. After using
adversarial training we could get close to 86.66% accu-
racy on CIFAR 10. So regardless of data set, our proposed
defense method helps in improving accuracy without adver-
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sary training. However, to achieve better accuracy, we need
to include adversarial training. The accuracy reported in
this paper is higher than the original thermometer encoding
paper because we used a deeper architecture which makes
the thermometer defense more robust.
After observing result for SVHN and CIFAR 10 it is clear
that BN and smoothing causes a lot of sacrifice in clean
data accuracy. This results in the model not learning prop-
erly during the training. As a result when we combine BN
and Smoothing we get the worst result for this two datasets.
THus we chose to keep only the tanh function in our pro-
posed defense for CIFAR 10 and SVHN dataset. In the next
section we analyze the expreimental result and try to explain
their relative phenomenon.
6. Analysis
Based on the experimental results discussed in previous
section, it shows that blind pre-processing can defend only
MNIST data set without adversarial training. blind pre-
processing can also defend against SVHN and CIFAR10
with adversarial training. We thus claim that the need for
adversarial training for MNIST data set was eliminated. In
this section we present some more in-depth analysis on
MNIST data set to establish our claim. We also report
black box attack accuracy in this section to prove the attacks
strength even further.
In order to demonstrate the strength of our defense we show
how far our defense can go in terms of defending in the ad-
vent of very strong attacks (Ma˛dry et al., 2017; Jacob Buck-
man, 2018). By changing the value of  the strength of
the attack can be modified. A larger value of  indicates
stronger attack. It was observed that the performance of
previous defenses decreases exponentially with increasing
attack strength as shown in table 5. However, BP defense
strength decreases only a small amount with increasing at-
tack strength is another proof of the success of BP as a
universal robust defense.
Table 6. Result of defense after increasing the attack strength- on
MNIST
Value of  BP WithoutAdv BP WithAdv Thermo WithAdv
0.1 98.99 99.07 98.52
0.2 98.68 98.88 96.85
0.3 98.36 98.61 94.02
0.4 97.78 98.22 82.64
0.5 95.52 97.88 38.08
As described earlier changing the value of  would change
the accuracy a lot since it decides how much the input image
would be changed to cause the miss classifications. Our de-
fense can withstand this power full attack even if the value
of  is increased to 0.5. No previous defense method, even
under weaker attacks like FGSM, can withstand such large
level of change against MNIST data set. What makes it more
interesting is that this result can be achieved even without
adversarial training. If this defense model combined with
adversarial training then this would become the strongest
defense ever reported against MNIST data set. On the other
hand the accuracy thermometer encoding drops down to
38.08% when =0.5, even using adversarial training. We
analyse this robustness of our defense against Carlini Wag-
ner method now. The mean distance change to cause the
miscalssification against carlini wagner attack is a metrice
to evaluate e defenses robustness.
Table 7. Value of α on Different combination
Defense α accuracy
Tanh+BN 49.8 98.65
Tanh+ Filter 45.98 83.54
Filter+BN 49.78 98.63
All three 49.78 98.61
We also found that overall strength of the defense depends
on the accuracy of clean data as well. In order to analyze it,
we first define an important parameter called attacked data
accuracy ratio (α). If we assume the accuracy on clean data
is x% and on attacked data is y% then,
α =
y
(x+ y)
∗ 100% (5)
We observed that defense combination that performed well
in table 3 and 4 do have a higher value of α. Lets look back
at the same combination of table 3 for using adversarial
training in table 7.
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Figure 4. CIFAR 10 dataset pixel frequency distribution by using
different BP
The higher the accuracy, the higher the value of α in table 7 .
It is also the same for svhn and cifar 10. The significance of
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increasing α is that, with increasing performance of the de-
fense, the clean data accuracy actually goes down a little bit.
Better defense performance usually comes with a little sacri-
fice of clean data accuracy. Since BN performed the best for
MNIST it also maintained a greater value of α indicating
it will hamper the clean data accuracy most. As MNIST
is a small dataset the effect was negligible. However, for
SVHN and CIFAR 10, this effect on accuracy degradation
on clean data was severe. That’s why we choose to drop BN
from the model. As we found tanh optimizes between clean
data accuracy and attacked data accuracy best for those two.
We could also explain this phenomenon of BN not working
against cifar by analysing the pixel intensity distribution of
the dataset.
In order to understand the robustness of our defense more
intuitively it is necessary to understand the frequency dis-
tribution of dataset pixels. As shown in fig. 4, the whole
dataset’s pixel distribution completely changes after apply-
ing blind pre-processing. We understand that this redistri-
bution in the image pixels plays an important role in the
robustness of the defense. In fig. 4 typical CIFAR 10 dataset
frequency distribution is displayed with pixel values on the
x axis and their appearing frequency in the y axis. This
distribution’s standard deviation changes completely after
applying Tanh processing. The key point is before applying
blind pre-processing the pixel values are clustered around a
certain pixel range. After processing with tanh their pixel
standard deviation increases and becomes more scattered.
As a result the pixel difference between the edges of the
digit or object becomes larger. Thus fooling the network be-
comes harder as introducing noises will have less impact on
the images due to larger transition near the edges. However,
for CIFAR 10 BN does not change the distribution much
like MNIST. The inability to change this distribution is one
of the reason for the failure of BN in CIFAR 10 dataset.
7. Summary
We presented a robust defense method that uses a combina-
tion of pre-processing layers to defend against adversarial
attacks. We choose tanh and batch normalization as our
blind pre-processing layer. This processing layer is com-
pletely unknown and not accessible to the attacker. We
could defend MNIST data set for the first time without us-
ing adversarial training. That reduces training time and
complexity in the defense model. A combination of tanh
and batch normalization worked in improving MNIST accu-
racy to close to 98% from zero without adversarial examples.
Moreoever, we showed that increasing attack defense where
other defenses fail, our defense remains one of the strongest
ever reported. Additionally the proposed BP model worked
better than recent defenses against SVHN and CIFAR 10 as
well. But, it required adversarial training to recover the ac-
curacy upto 95% for SVHN and 86% for Cifar 10. We also
showed under varying attack strength our defense would
outperform its recent counter part.
8. Discussion
Currently, we are conducting experiments on a variety of
attack. We got more than good result in defending FGSM,
Carlini Wagner attack and also on black box box. We are
also the first to defend against FGSM attack without adver-
sarial training reaching close to 96 % accuracy. Again for
Carlini Wagner attack our defense model requires highest
amount input perturbation to miss-classify the input for all
three distance metrices. One of the strongest attack recently
released succeeded in breaking all the ICLR 2018 defend
models. Even though we tested against obfuscated gradient
attack (Athalye et al., 2018) and got reasonable amount of
success but our concept of blind pre-processing actually
makes their attack void.
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